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naming names in such a distinguished 
public forum.
In the takeover process, an incum-
bent CEO might well not be paying 
attention to maximising shareholder 
value, but instead manning her or his 
own personal lifeboat. Our research – 
arguably the most extensive research 
undertaken to date in this field – un-
covers a significantly negative rela-
tion between target CEO retention 
and takeover premiums received by 
target shareholders. 
Our calculations, using publicly 
available data, show that the retention 
of target CEOs is, on average, related to 
a 6-percentage-point reduction in the 
four-week takeover premium paid to 
target shareholders. Given the US$1.15 
billion average market capitalisation 
of the target firms in our sample, this 
premium reduction translates into a 
sizable value loss of around US$70 mil-
lion to the shareholders of an average 
size target. 
Moreover, when the target CEO 
was not retained, we document a sig-
nificantly negative relation between 
the relative importance of severance 
pay received by target CEOs and the 
takeover premium received by target 
shareholders. Our investigation of the 
joint effect of target CEO retention and 
CEO severance pay on takeover premi-
ums further confirms both effects to be 
significantly negative. 
Our calculations show that a 10-per-
centage-point increase in the relative 
importance of severance pay received 
by non-retained target CEOs is related 
to a 1.2-percentage-point reduction 
in the four-week takeover premium 
This is one of the intriguing sugges-
tions to emerge from the in-depth 
research undertaken that resulted in 
Do target CEOs trade premiums for per-
sonal benefits?, the paper I co-wrote 
with Svetoslav Trapkov of United 
Bulgarian Bank and Fadi Yakoub of 
Rabobank, which was published in 
Elsevier's Journal of Banking & Finance 
in early 2014. 
The short headline answer to what 
some people might think is a provoca-
tive question is, quite simply, yes. A re-
sounding yes. If our analysis of 2,198 
completed US M&A transactions be-
tween 1994 and 2010 is correct, CEOs 
leading a target company will often be 
tempted to encourage acceptance of 
a bid that falls short of delivering full 
value to shareholders in return for the 
assurance of continued employment 
with the post-merger entity or an in-
creased personal severance package.
In an era when the notions of 
commercial transparency and corpo-
rate governance requiring levels of 
disclosure unparalleled in joint stock 
company history have been elevated 
to almost sacred status, it is frankly 
little short of astonishing that such an 
anomaly should persist. If sharehold-
ers are not already picketing regulators 
to address the issue, they should begin 
doing so immediately. Conscientious 
regulators would surely not wait for 
such an external stimulus.
Conflict of interest
The conflict of interest in such a situ-
ation is self-evident. Senior managers 
have an undisputed fiduciary duty 
(inter alia) to deliver maximum value 
to shareholders in their company. In 
cases where a bid is made for that com-
pany, their prime concern should be to 
ensure that either the premium paid 
by the would-be buyer is maximised, 
or that the company delivers increased 
value by warding off the predator and 
improving its business performance.
However, even the most stony-
faced CEO remains a human being; and 
human beings who have been unex-
pectedly threatened with the potential 
loss of their jobs, their status and their 
power, in the event that an acquisition 
proceeds, will almost instinctively put 
their own selfish personal interests first 
and foremost. Anecdotal evidence ex-
ists in abundance that proves this con-
tention; unfortunately the possibility of 
provoking legal action dictates against 
08   |   4th Quarter 2014
Do CEOs trade premiums for 
personal gain in M&As?
By Buhui Qiu
Chief executive officers are not to be fully trusted. At least, says a 
new study, chief executive officers at companies on the receiving 
end of a planned merger and acquisition transaction are not to be 
fully trusted. 
Management Knowledge
RSM DISCOVERY
received by target shareholders, which 
translates to a sizable value loss to the 
tune of US$13 million to shareholders 
of an average-size target in the non-
retention subsample. 
Personal gain
While some might argue that the fig-
ures are modest in both relative and 
absolute terms, the trend for CEOs to 
serve their own interests rather than 
those of their shareholders is clear: in 
certain circumstances, such as during 
corporate takeovers, they will tend to 
sacrifice shareholder value for person-
al gain. This is unacceptable behaviour 
for those entrusted with the temporary 
stewardship of a publicly listed com-
pany and steps must surely be taken 
to prevent it.
I detect at least two clear threats 
created by a situation in which current 
legislation and market practice do not 
necessarily require the publication of 
information relating to the retention of 
a CEO. One, if this information is hid-
den, it cannot form a part of the share-
holder decision-making process and it 
could clearly increase the temptation 
for any CEO to indulge in a trade-off 
that benefits the CEO at the expense 
of shareholders.
Two, an acquiring firm could seek to 
acquire the target at a lower price by 
suggesting that the target CEO's nest 
be unduly feathered. Both will have the 
potential to damage shareholder value 
of the target firm.
There is no question in our mind 
that shareholders should demand 
full disclosure of all information re-
lated to the continued employment 
of incumbent senior management 
post-merger, or to their proposed 
severance packages.
There is equally no doubt that 
the information must be divulged. 
Dragging such information into the 
daylight is one way of ensuring that 
shareholders are not cheated out of 
what full value is rightfully theirs. Until 
this happens, we run the risk that per-
sonal greed will persist and continue to 
override management's fiduciary duty 
to shareholders.
Opponents of these findings will 
likely argue that coincidence does not 
necessarily mean cause and effect, and 
that the relationships we have identi-
fied is therefore spurious. But a few 
key points suggest otherwise. One, the 
size of our sample is unprecedented in 
the literature.
Two, controlling for a battery of 
CEO, target, deal, and acquirer charac-
teristics commonly identified by the lit-
erature as affecting takeover premium 
and announcement returns, as well as 
for industry and year fixed effects, we 
continue to find significantly negative 
effects of target CEO retention and sev-
erance pay on takeover premium and 
target announcement stock returns.
Third, our findings continue to hold 
when we use managerial ability as an 
instrument for predicting target CEO 
retention, and employ a Heckman two-
stage correction approach. Fourth, we 
find the negative relation between tar-
get CEO retention and takeover pre-
mium to be strengthened when the 
target CEO obtained a more important 
position in the merged entity, and the 
negative relation between target CEO 
severance pay and takeover premium 
to be strengthened when severance 
pay is negotiated during the takeover 
process rather than predefined in a 
CEO’s golden parachute plan.
We are confident in our findings 
and conclude that while the current 
situation might be legal, it is certainly 
not ethical. 
This article is based on the paper Do 
target CEOs trade premiums for per-
sonal benefits?, written by Buhui Qiu, 
Svetoslav Trapkov and Fadi Yakoub and 
published in the Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 42 (2014) 23-41. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.01.013
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